Travail personnel, using an earlier version of File:Blank map of Europe (without disputed regions).svg. (Note that the southeastern part of Turkey is within the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Antioch rather than that of Constantinople). Sources used in creating this map:

• The most important data come from the table of recognition of the OCU by other Eastern Orthodox Churches at en:Orthodox Church of Ukraine#Recognition by the other Eastern Orthodox churches. This should be checked for updates, and if there are any, this map may be updated on that basis.
• The 2018 Moscow-Constantinople schism map posted on 12 September 2020 on the MapPorn subreddit has been taken as an inspiration for the colouring scheme, but not as a source for the data (which are often inaccurate or outdated by May 2025).
• File:Organization of Autocephalus Eastern Orthodox Churches (January 2020).svg (also partially outdated) has also been used for understanding the canonical status and internal/external relations of the various Eastern Orthodox Church bodies.
• Estonia: the 1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism was settled by recognising two different churches: the mostly Estonian-speaking Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) under jurisdiction of Constantinople, and the mostly Russian-speaking Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP) under jurisdiction of Moscow. On 20 August 2024, the EOC-MP unilaterally declared its autocephaly from Moscow, while the Estonian Parliament on 9 April 2025 adopted a law which banned churches from having ties with the Russian Orthodox Church due to its overt collaboration in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The current status of the EOC(-MP) is unclear; it has cut ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, but has so far rejected merging with the Constantinople-aligned EAOC as well.

"Estnisch-orthodoxe Kirche erklärt sich für unabhängig von Moskau". katholisch.de (in German). 21 August 2024. Retrieved 15 February 2025.
"Estland verabschiedet Gesetz gegen russische Kirche: Kirchliche Kontakte nach Moskau verboten". Domradio.de (in German). 10 April 2025. Retrieved 10 April 2025.
Tim Zadorozhnyy (10 April 2025). Estonia passes law targeting Moscow-linked church ties. The Kyiv Independent. Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

• Latvia: the Latvian Orthodox Church (LOC) was under the Moscow Patriarchate, but on 8 September 2022, the Latvian Parliament directed the LOC to accept a status of autocephaly due to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow's overt support for the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. The LOC has indicated a preparedness to comply, although no other Orthodox Churches have so far (December 2022) recognised its autocephaly, which has been disputed by the Moscow Patriarchate.

(Orthodox Church of Latvia seceded from Moscow – It was a matter of national security, says the President orthodoxtimes.com September 10, 2022.)

Meanwhile, the small Latvian Orthodox Autonomous Church (LOAC), which unilaterally split from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1994, was legally registered as a jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in October 2019, explicitly rejecting any ties with the Moscow Patriarchate in doing so.

Latvijas Pareizticīgā Autonomā Baznīca, Konstantinopoles Patriarhāta jurisdikcijā, 40801052674 | Uzņēmumi | Firmas.lv. Archived from the original on 1 серпня 2021. Retrieved on 1 серпня 2021.
Latvijas Pareizticīgā Autonomā Baznīca, Konstantinopoles Patriarhāta jurisdikcijā, 40801052674 - par uzņēmumu. Archived from the original on 23 лютого 2021. Retrieved on 1 серпня 2021.
Официальный сайт Латвийской Православной Церкви. Archived from the original on 1 серпня 2021. Retrieved on 1 серпня 2021.

• Lithuania: In Lithuania, most people who profess a religion adhere to the Catholic Church (74.19% in the 2021 census), while only 4.4% adhere to Eastern Orthodoxy. Metropolitan Innokenty of the Russian Orthodox Diocese (Eparchy) of Lithuania was quick to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, and requested the Moscow Patriarchate to grant his eparchy autonomy in May 2022. Although the ROC Synod responded by setting up a commission to consider the matter, nothing has been heard from it since (as of January 2023). In response, the Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Lithuania, or simply Exarchate in Lithuania, was established in 2023 (recognised by the government of Lithuania in 2024), with several parishes from the Moscow-aligned Eparchy of Lithuania switching over to the new Constantinople-aligned Exarchate.

Ksenia Luchenko (31 January 2023). Why the Russian Orthodox Church Supports the War in Ukraine. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

Thanos Chrysanthopoulos (11 February 2024). "Patriarchal Exarchate of Lithuania was legally recognized by Lithuanian State Authorities". Orthodox Times. Retrieved 23 May 2025.

• Moldova: Since 1991, there has been a dispute between the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova (under the Moscow Patriarchate) and the Metropolis of Bessarabia (under the Romanian Orthodox Church). Both claim exclusive canonical jurisdiction over the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and neither recognises the other. The Moscow–Constantinople schism since 2018 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine since February 2022 have impacted this existing dispute. In September 2024, Orthodox Times reported that "The Metropolis of Bessarabia now comprises over 200 parishes. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, more than 60 priests have left the Metropolis of Moldova, [under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow, to join the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which belongs to the Romanian Orthodox Church,] signifying a significant realignment within the Orthodox community in the region." (The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova probably still had over 1000 parishes remaining at the time.)

Priests from Moldova leave Moscow Patriarchate and join Romanian Church | Orthodox Times (en). Orthodox Times (en) (17 September 2024). Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

• North Macedonia: The Macedonian Orthodox Church – Archdiocese of Ohrid (MOC-AO) was granted autocephaly by the Serbian Orthodox Church in May/June 2022. This was unusual, as granting autocephaly is commonly considered a prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. As of May 2025, negotiations regarding a final arrangement were still ongoing between the various patriarchates and autocephalous churches. While the Serbian Orthodox Church has voiced opposition to autocephaly for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the MOC-AO has not made any definitive statements regarding the OCU yet, focusing on its own status first. In March 2023, the Synod of the MOC-AO decided "not to concelebrate with the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine until the full resolution of its status in the fullness of Orthodoxy". In July 2024, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople responded to the MOC-AO that recognising the OCU's autocephaly would be a precondition before the MOC-AO itself should receive autocephaly.

Macedonian Church rejects communion with Ukrainian schismatics. OrthoChristian (31 March 2023). Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

Ecumenical Patriarchate will not grant autocephaly to the Church of North Macedonia until it recognizes the OCU, - Hierarch of the Greek Church - RISU. Religious Information Service of Ukraine (19 July 2024). Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

• Polish Orthodox Church: In Poland, relatively few people are registered members of the Polish Orthodox Church (about 0.5 million in 2016) compared to the Catholic Church in Poland (about 40.55 million in 2014/2017). On 2 April 2019, the assembly of bishops of the Polish Orthodox Church released a communiqué. In it, it reiterated its stance taken 9 May and 15 November 2018. The communiqué says "that the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was and is in favour of granting full independence – autocephaly – to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine", and that autocephaly should be given "according to the dogmatic and canonical norms of the whole Church, and not of a group of schismatics. Those who left the Church and have been deprived of their priestly ordination, cannot represent a healthy ecclesial body. It is an uncanonical act, violating the Eucharistic and inter-Orthodox unity." The decision of the Assembly on the OCU was reaffirmed on 26 October 2021.

ORTHODOX | Komunikat Kancelarii Św. Soboru Biskupów. www.orthodox.pl (2 April 2019). Archived from the original on 2021-06-29. Retrieved on 23 May 2025.
Komunikat Kancelarii Św. Soboru Biskupów. www.orthodox.pl (27 October 2021). Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

• Georgian Orthodox Church: In February 2019, the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church issued a statement that rejected what they saw as pressure and threats on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) on the Ukrainian issue. As of August 2024, the Georgian Orthodox Church has not recognised the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). On the other hand, the Georgian Orthodox Church did recognise the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in February 2023. Georgian scholars explained the attitude of the Georgian Orthodox Church as one that did not dare disagreeing with the Moscow Patriarchate on Ukraine-related matters out of fear of angering the Russian Orthodox Church.

საქართველოს საპატრიარქოს განცხადება (01.02.2019) (géorgien). patriarchate.ge (1 February 2019). Archived from the original on 2019-07-11. Retrieved on 22 October 2019.

Vidka Atanasova, Rostyslav Khotin, Volodymyr Ivakhnenko, Mike Eckel (30 August 2024). "Pro-War Policies Put Russia's Orthodox Church Under Increasing Pressure Outside Russia". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 23 May 2025.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

• Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia (OCCLS): See en:Reactions of the Eastern Orthodox churches to the 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism#Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia for more information. Very few people in the Czech Republic (41,178 in the 2021 census) or in Slovakia (50,677 in the 2021 census) are registered members of the OCCLS. As of November 2019, most OCCLS officials had not recognised the OCU, but Bishop Isaiah (Slaninka) of Šumperk, Vicar of Olomouc and Brno Eparchy, concelebrated the Divine Liturgy with OCU primate Epiphanius I of Ukraine in Kyiv on 20 November 2019. On the other hand, OCCLS primate metropolitan Rastislav (Gont) of Prešov, Archbishop Michal (Michael) (Dandár) of Prague (Bohemia), and Archbishop Juraj (George) (Stransky) of Michalovce and Košice (Slovakia), have each voiced criticism of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople's decision to grant autocephaly to a group of three churches, two of which (the UOC-KP and UAOC) were previously widely considered "schismatic". They do not rule out OCU autocephaly, but generally propose a pan-Orthodox council to settle the matter (thus postponing a decision). Religious scholar Oleksandr Sagan stated in April 2025: "The [OCCLS] position on the non-recognition of the OCU remains unclear. In November 2019, one of the hierarchs of this church concelebrated with Metropolitan Epiphanius. However, the matter did not progress further – this church [as a whole] does not recognise the OCU." Therefore, the OCCLS jurisdiction in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is coloured "No definitive statements yet regarding the OCU".

Bishop from Czech Orthodox Church concelebrated with Metropolitan Epifaniy of Kyiv. Orthodox Times (en) (21 November 2019). Retrieved on 23 May 2025.

Hierarchs of UOC and OCCLS celebrate joint service in Prague. Raskolam-net.info (17 March 2025). Retrieved on 30 May 2025.

Andrei Ivanov. OCCLS head congratulates UOC Primate on 50th anniversary of monastic vows. UOJ. Retrieved on 30 May 2025.

Czech hierarch: What is happening in Ukraine is unbelievable. OrthoChristian.Com (25 January 2019). Retrieved on 30 May 2025.

Tymoshchuk, Yaroslava (18 April 2025). Автокефалія чи агентура в рясах? Через що розгорівся скандал у православній церкві Чеських земель та Словаччини – і до чого тут Україна (ukrainien). Radop Liberty. Retrieved on 30 May 2025.