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Utilisateur:Simon Villeneuve/Liste de biais cognitifs

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Article principal : biais cognitifs.

Les biais cognitifs sont des schémas systématiques d'écart du jugement par rapport à la norme et/ou à la rationalité. Ils sont souvent étudiés en psychologie, en sociologie et en économie comportementale[1].

Bien que la réalité de la plupart de ces biais soit confirmée par des recherches reproductibles[2] [3], la manière de les classer ou de les expliquer soulève souvent des controverses[4]. Ainsi, par exemple, Gerd Gigerenzer critique la présentation des biais cognitifs comme des erreurs de jugement et préfère les interpréter comme résultant de déviations rationnelles de la pensée logique[5].

Plusieurs biais cognitifs peuvent être classés par leur mécanisme générateur commun[6]. Les explications incluent des règles de traitement de l'information sensorielle telles les raccourcis mentaux que le cerveau utilise pour produire des décisions ou des jugements.

Les biais ont diverses formes et apparaissent comme des biais cognitifs ("froids"), tels que le bruit mental[6], ou des biais motivationnels ("chauds"), comme lorsque les croyances sont déformées par des pensées désidératives. Les deux effets peuvent être présents en même temps[7],[8].

Il existe également des controverses sur certains de ces biais quant à savoir s'ils sont considérés comme inutiles ou irrationnels, ou s'ils entraînent des attitudes ou des comportements utiles. Par exemple, lorsqu'ils apprennent à connaître les autres, les gens ont tendance à poser des questions insidieuses qui semblent biaisées pour confirmer leurs hypothèses sur la personne. Cependant, ce type de biais de confirmation peut être considéré comme un exemple de compétence sociale, un moyen d'établir une connexion avec l'autre personne[9].

Bien que cette recherche implique massivement des sujets humains, certaines découvertes qui démontrent des biais ont également été trouvées chez des animaux non humains. Par exemple, l'aversion aux pertes a été démontrée chez les singes et une actualisation hyperbolique a été observée chez les rats, les pigeons et les singes. [10]

Croyance, prise de décision et comportement modifier

Ces biais affectent les croyances, le processus de raisonnement, les décisions d'affaires et économiques et le comportement humain en général.

Nom Type Description
biais d'action Tendance à vouloir agir lorsqu'un problème survient, ou par extension par anticipation d'un problème, même si l'inaction serait plus efficace[11],[12].
biais de l'addition Tendance à résoudre les problème avec l'addition, même si la soustraction est une meilleure approche[13],[14]
détection d'agent fausse prémisse L'inclinaison à présumer l'intervention réfléchie d'un agent conscient ou intelligent dans des situations qui peuvent ou non en impliquer.
effet d’ambiguïté théorie des perspectives Tendance à éviter les options pour lesquelles la probabilité de succès est inconnue[15]
effet d'ancrage ancrage Tendance à trop se fier à un seul aspect du problème lors d'une prise de décision (généralement la première information acquise sur le sujet)[16],[17].
pensée anthropocentrée biais de disponibilité Tendance à utiliser des analogies centrées sur l'humain comme base de raisonnement pour d'autres phénomènes biologiques peu familiers[18].
anthropomorphisme ou
personnification 		biais de disponibilité Tendance à caractériser les objets, animaux et concepts abstraits selon des traits humains tels des émotions ou intentions[19]. Le biais opposé est la déshumanisation[20].
biais d'attention biais de disponibilité Tendance des perceptions à être affectées par des préoccupations ou centre d'intérêt de l'individu[21].
biais de substitution (en) Se produit lorsqu'un jugement simplifié est substitué à un jugement complexe.
biais d'automatisation (en) fausses prémisses Tendance à trop se fier à des systèmes de traitement automatique de l'information[22].
heuristique de disponibilité biais de disponibilité Tendance à surestimer les probabilités likelihood of events with greater "availability" in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.[23]
Backfire effect Confirmation bias The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs.[24] Note: the existence of this bias as a widespread phenomenon has been disputed in empirical studies.
Base rate fallacy or
Base rate neglect 		Extension neglect The tendency to ignore general information and focus on information only pertaining to the specific case, even when the general information is more important.[25]
Belief bias Truthiness An effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[26]
Berkson's paradox Logical fallacy The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities.[27]
Clustering illusion Apophenia The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns).[17]
Common source bias Anchoring bias The tendency to combine or compare research studies from the same source, or from sources that use the same methodologies or data.[28]
Compassion fade Extension neglect The predisposition to behave more compassionately towards a small number of identifiable victims than to a large number of anonymous ones.[29]
Confirmation bias Confirmation bias The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.[30]
Congruence bias Confirmation bias The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses.[17]
Conjunction fallacy Extension neglect The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than a more general version of those same conditions.[31]
Conservatism bias
(belief revision) 		Anchoring bias The tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence.[6],[32],[33]
Continued influence effect Confirmation bias The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred.[34] cf. Backfire effect
Contrast effect Framing effect The enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus' perception when compared with a recently observed, contrasting object.[35]
Curse of knowledge When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people.[36]
Declinism The predisposition to view the past favorably (rosy retrospection) and future negatively.[37]
Decoy effect Framing effect Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in all respects) and partially dominated by option A.[38]
Default effect Framing effect When given a choice between several options, the tendency to favor the default one.[39]
Denomination effect Framing effect The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g., coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).[40]
Disposition effect théorie des perspectives The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value.
Distinction bias Framing effect The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[41]
Dread aversion théorie des perspectives Just as losses yield double the emotional impact of gains, dread yields double the emotional impact of savouring.[42][1]
Dunning–Kruger effect The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability.[43]
Duration neglect Extension neglect The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value.[44]
Hot-cold empathy gap The tendency to underestimate the influence of visceral drives on one's attitudes, preferences, and behaviors.[45]
End-of-history illusion The age-independent belief that one will change less in the future than one has in the past.[46]
Endowment effect théorie des perspectives The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.[47]
Modèle:Vanchor The tendency to expect or predict more extreme outcomes than those outcomes that actually happen.[6]
Experimenter's or
expectation bias 		Confirmation bias The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.[48]
Forer effect or
Barnum effect 		Egocentric bias The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as astrology, fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests.[49]
Form function attribution bias In human–robot interaction, the tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot. People may base their expectations and perceptions of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot.[50]
Framing effect Framing effect Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented.
Frequency illusion or
Baader–Meinhof phenomenon 		biais de disponibilité The frequency illusion is that once something has been noticed then every instance of that thing is noticed, leading to the belief it has a high frequency of occurrence (a form of selection bias).[51] The Baader–Meinhof phenomenon is the illusion where something that has recently come to one's attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards.[52],[53] It was named after an incidence of frequency illusion in which the Baader–Meinhof Group was mentioned.[54]
Functional fixedness Anchoring bias Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.[55]
Gambler's fallacy Logical fallacy The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."[56]
Gender bias False priors A widely held[57] set of implicit biases that discriminate against a gender. For example, the assumption that women are less suited to jobs requiring high intellectual ability.[58] Or the assumption that people or animals are male in the absence of any indicators of gender.[59]
Hard–easy effect The tendency to overestimate one's ability to accomplish hard tasks, and underestimate one's ability to accomplish easy tasks[6],[60],[61],[62]
Hindsight bias Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable[63] before they happened.
Hot-hand fallacy Logical fallacy The "hot-hand fallacy" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand") is the belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts.
Hungry judge effect Judicial decision making and mood may be affected by physiological factors such as what the judge had for breakfast.
Hyperbolic discounting Extension neglect Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that are inconsistent over time – people make choices today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning.[64] Also known as current moment bias, present-bias, and related to Dynamic inconsistency. A good example of this: a study showed that when making food choices for the coming week, 74% of participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day, 70% chose chocolate.
IKEA effect Effort justification The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from IKEA, regardless of the quality of the end product.[65]
Illicit transference Logical fallacy Occurs when a term in the distributive (referring to every member of a class) and collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense are treated as equivalent. The two variants of this fallacy are the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.
Illusion of control Egocentric bias The tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.[66]
Illusion of validity Egocentric bias Overestimating the accuracy of one's judgments, especially when available information is consistent or inter-correlated.[67]
Illusory correlation Apophenia Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events.[68],[69]
Illusory truth effect Truthiness A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of truthiness.
Impact bias The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.[70]
Implicit association biais de disponibilité The speed with which people can match words depends on how closely they are associated.
Information bias The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[71]
Insensitivity to sample size Extension neglect The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples.
Interoceptive bias The tendency for sensory input about the body itself to affect one's judgement about external, unrelated circumstances. (As for example, in parole judges who are more lenient when fed and rested.) [72],[73],[74],[75]
Irrational escalation or
Escalation of commitment 		Logical fallacy The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy.
Law of the instrument Anchoring bias An over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative approaches. "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."
Less-is-better effect Extension neglect The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but not jointly.
Loss aversion théorie des perspectives The perceived disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it.[76] (see also Sunk cost effects and endowment effect).
Mere exposure effect Familiarity principle The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.[77]
Money illusion The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[78]
Moral credential effect Occurs when someone who does something good gives themselves permission to be less good in the future.
Neglect of probability Extension neglect The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.[79]
Non-adaptive choice switching[80] After experiencing a bad outcome with a decision problem, the tendency to avoid the choice previously made when faced with the same decision problem again, even though the choice was optimal. Also known as "once bitten, twice shy" or "hot stove effect".
Normalcy bias Cognitive dissonance The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before.
Observer-expectancy effect Confirmation bias When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect).
Omission bias The tendency to judge harmful actions (commissions) as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful inactions (omissions).[81]
Optimism bias The tendency to be over-optimistic, underestimating greatly the probability of undesirable outcomes and overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes (see also wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome bias).[82],[83]
Ostrich effect Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
Outcome bias The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
Overconfidence effect Egocentric bias Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[6],[84],[85],[86]
Pareidolia Apophenia A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing non-existent hidden messages on records played in reverse.
Pessimism bias The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.
Plan continuation bias Logical fallacy Failure to recognize that the original plan of action is no longer appropriate for a changing situation or for a situation that is different than anticipated.[87]
Planning fallacy Egocentric bias The tendency to underestimate one's own task-completion times.[70]
Present bias The tendency of people to give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs between two future moments.[88]
Plant blindness The tendency to ignore plants in their environment and a failure to recognize and appreciate the utility of plants to life on earth.[89]
Prevention bias When investing money to protect against risks, decision makers perceive that a dollar spent on prevention buys more security than a dollar spent on timely detection and response, even when investing in either option is equally effective.[90]
Probability matching Sub-optimal matching of the probability of choices with the probability of reward in a stochastic context.
Pro-innovation bias The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation's usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and weaknesses.
Projection bias The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one's current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices.[91],[92],[93]
Proportionality bias Our innate tendency to assume that big events have big causes, may also explain our tendency to accept conspiracy theories.[94],[95]
Pseudocertainty effect théorie des perspectives The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[96]
Recency illusion The illusion that a phenomenon one has noticed only recently is itself recent. Often used to refer to linguistic phenomena; the illusion that a word or language usage that one has noticed only recently is an innovation when it is, in fact, long-established (see also frequency illusion). Also Recency bias is a cognitive bias that favors recent events over historic ones. A memory bias, recency bias gives "greater importance to the most recent event",[97] such as the final lawyer's closing argument a jury hears before being dismissed to deliberate.
Systematic bias Judgement that arises when targets of differentiating judgement become subject to effects of regression that are not equivalent.[98]
Restraint bias Egocentric bias The tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
Rhyme as reason effect Truthiness Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful.
Risk compensation / Peltzman effect The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases.
Salience bias biais de disponibilité The tendency to focus on items that are more prominent or emotionally striking and ignore those that are unremarkable, even though this difference is often irrelevant by objective standards.
Scope neglect or
scope insensitivity 		Extension neglect The tendency to be insensitive to the size of a problem when evaluating it. For example, being willing to pay as much to save 2,000 children or 20,000 children
Selection bias biais de disponibilité Happens when the members of a statistical sample are not chosen completely at random, which leads to the sample not being representative of the population.
Selective perception Confirmation bias The tendency for expectations to affect perception.
Semmelweis reflex Confirmation bias The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.[33]
Status quo bias théorie des perspectives The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[99],[100]
Stereotyping False priors Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.
Subadditivity effect Logical fallacy The tendency to judge the probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.[101]
Subjective validation Truthiness Perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
Surrogation Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest.
Survivorship bias biais de disponibilité Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of visibility.
System justification théorie des perspectives The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
Time-saving bias Logical fallacy Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively high speed.
Parkinson's law of triviality The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known as bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid specialized or complex subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor, and instead focus on something easy to grasp or rewarding to the average participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike shed.[102]
Unconscious bias Also known as implicit biases, are the underlying attitudes and stereotypes that people unconsciously attribute to another person or group of people that affect how they understand and engage with them. Many researchers suggest that unconscious bias occurs automatically as the brain makes quick judgments based on past experiences and background.[103]
Modèle:Vanchor The standard suggested amount of consumption (e.g., food serving size) is perceived to be appropriate, and a person would consume it all even if it is too much for this particular person.[104]
Weber–Fechner law Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities.
Well travelled road effect biais de disponibilité Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-travelled routes and overestimation of the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.
Women are wonderful effect A tendency to associate more positive attributes with women than with men.
Zero-risk bias Extension neglect Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.
Zero-sum bias Logical fallacy A bias whereby a situation is incorrectly perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e., one person gains at the expense of another).

Sociaux modifier

Name Type Description
Actor-observer bias Attribution bias The tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error), and for explanations of one's own behaviors to do the opposite (that is, to overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality).
Authority bias Association fallacy The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.[105]
Availability cascade Conformity bias A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").[106]
Bandwagon effect Conformity bias The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.[107]
Ben Franklin effect Cognitive dissonance A person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do another favor for that person than they would be if they had received a favor from that person.[108]
Bias blind spot Egocentric bias The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.[109]
Cheerleader effect Association fallacy The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation.[110]
Courtesy bias Conformity bias The tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one's true opinion, so as to avoid offending anyone.[111]
Defensive attribution hypothesis Attribution bias Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more severe or as personal or situational similarity to the victim increases.
Defensive othering effect Attribution bias Occurs when perceived similarities with the stigmatized group trigger a protective behavior of distancing (othering) self (or someone else) from "others" as a means to avoid a certain negative outcome associated with "others."[112] (related to DAH).
Egocentric bias Egocentric bias Occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them with.
Extrinsic incentives bias Attribution bias An exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself
False consensus effect Egocentric bias The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[113]
False uniqueness bias Egocentric bias The tendency of people to see their projects and themselves as more singular than they actually are.[114]
Fundamental attribution error Attribution bias The tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior[93] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[115]
Group attribution error The biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise.
Groupthink Conformity bias The psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences.
Halo effect Association fallacy The tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one personality area to another in others' perceptions of them (see also physical attractiveness stereotype).[116]
Hostile attribution bias Attribution bias The "hostile attribution bias" is the tendency to interpret others' behaviors as having hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign.[117]
Illusion of asymmetric insight Egocentric bias People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.[118]
Illusion of transparency Egocentric bias The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which their personal mental state is known by others, and to overestimate how well they understand others' personal mental states.
Illusory superiority Egocentric bias Overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect", "better-than-average effect", or "superiority bias".)[119]
Ingroup bias Ingroup bias The tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.
Intentionality bias Attribution bias Tendency to judge human action to be intentional rather than accidental.[120]
Just-world hypothesis Attribution bias The tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally just, causing them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as deserved by the victim(s).
Moral luck Attribution bias The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event.
Naïve cynicism Egocentric bias Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.
Naïve realism Egocentric bias The belief that we see reality as it really is – objectively and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us; and that those who don't are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased.
Not invented here Ingroup bias Aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or knowledge developed outside a group. Related to IKEA effect.
Outgroup homogeneity bias Ingroup bias Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.[121]
Puritanical bias Attribution bias Refers to the tendency to attribute cause of an undesirable outcome or wrongdoing by an individual to a moral deficiency or lack of self-control rather than taking into account the impact of broader societal determinants .[122]
Pygmalion effect The phenomenon whereby others' expectations of a target person affect the target person's performance.
Reactance The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see also Reverse psychology).
Reactive devaluation Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary.
Self-serving bias Attribution bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).[123]
Sexual overperception bias / Sexual underperception bias False priors The tendency to over-/underestimate sexual interest of another person in oneself.
Social comparison bias The tendency, when making decisions, to favour potential candidates who don't compete with one's own particular strengths.[124]
Social cryptomnesia A failure by people and society in general to remember the origin of a change, in which people know that a change has occurred in society, but forget how this change occurred; that is, the steps that were taken to bring this change about, and who took these steps. This has led to reduced social credit towards the minorities who made major sacrifices that led to the change in societal values.[125]
Social desirability bias Conformity bias The tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours in oneself and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or behaviours.[126] See also: Modèle:Slink.
Shared information bias Known as the tendency for group members to spend more time and energy discussing information that all members are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and less time and energy discussing information that only some members are aware of (i.e., unshared information).[127]
Trait ascription bias Egocentric bias The tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
Third-person effect Egocentric bias A tendency to believe that mass-communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves.
Ultimate attribution error Attribution bias Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.
Worse-than-average effect A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are difficult.[128]

Mémoriels modifier

En psychologie et en sciences cognitives, un biais mémoriel est un biais cognitif qui altère ou fausse le rappel mémoriel.

Nom Description
Bizarreness effect Bizarre material is better remembered than common material.
Choice-supportive bias The tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.[129]
Modèle:Vanchor or Regressive bias Tendency to remember high values and high likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than they actually were and low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on the evidence, memories are not extreme enough.[130][131]
Modèle:Vanchor Incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present attitudes and behaviour.[132]
Context effect That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-context memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories (e.g., recall time and accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at home, and vice versa).
Cross-race effect The tendency for people of one race to have difficulty identifying members of a race other than their own.
Cryptomnesia A form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination, because there is no subjective experience of it being a memory.[133]
Egocentric bias Recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g., remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as bigger than it really was.
Fading affect bias A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades more quickly than the emotion associated with positive events.[134]
False memory A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory.
Generation effect (Self-generation effect) That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people are better able to recall memories of statements that they have generated than similar statements generated by others.
Google effect The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by using Internet search engines.
Modèle:Vanchor That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones, which might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the increased cognitive processing time to understand the humor, or the emotional arousal caused by the humor.[135]
Lag effect The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out over time, as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single session. See also spacing effect.
Leveling and sharpening Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over time, often concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain details that take on exaggerated significance in relation to the details or aspects of the experience lost through leveling. Both biases may be reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection or re-telling of a memory.[136]
Levels-of-processing effect That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of effectiveness.[137]
Modèle:Vanchor A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the length of the list increases, the absolute number of items remembered increases as well. For example, consider a list of 30 items ("L30") and a list of 100 items ("L100"). An individual may remember 15 items from L30, or 50%, whereas the individual may remember 40 items from L100, or 40%. Although the percent of L30 items remembered (50%) is greater than the percent of L100 (40%), more L100 items (40) are remembered than L30 items (15).[138]Modèle:Further explanation needed
Misinformation effect Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from post-event information.[139]
Modality effect That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items were received via speech than when they were received through writing.
Mood-congruent memory bias The improved recall of information congruent with one's current mood.
Negativity bias or Negativity effect Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greater recall of unpleasant memories compared with positive memories.[140][93] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[115]
Next-in-line effect When taking turns speaking in a group using a predetermined order (e.g. going clockwise around a room, taking numbers, etc.) people tend to have diminished recall for the words of the person who spoke immediately before them.[141]
Part-list cueing effect That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item causes it to become harder to retrieve the other items.[142]
Peak–end rule That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the average of how it was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it ended.
Picture superiority effect The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more easily and frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by viewing their written word form counterparts.[143][144][145][146][147][148]
Positivity effect (Socioemotional selectivity theory) That older adults favor positive over negative information in their memories.
Serial position effect That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by the items at the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least likely to be remembered.[149]
Modèle:Vanchor That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.[150]
Reminiscence bump The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than personal events from other lifetime periods.[151]
Self-relevance effect That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to others.
Source confusion Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted memories.[152]
Spacing effect That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long span of time rather than a short one.
Spotlight effect The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your appearance or behavior.
Stereotype bias Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender).
Modèle:Vanchor Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that the subject is not required to recall.[153][154]
Suggestibility A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.
Tachypsychia When time perceived by the individual either lengthens, making events appear to slow down, or contracts.[155]
Telescoping effect The tendency to displace recent events backwards in time and remote events forward in time, so that recent events appear more remote, and remote events, more recent.
Testing effect The fact that you more easily remember information you have read by rewriting it instead of rereading it.[156]
Tip of the tongue phenomenon When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information, but is frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an instance of "blocking" where multiple similar memories are being recalled and interfere with each other.[133]
Modèle:Vanchor Overestimating the significance of the present.[157] It is related to chronological snobbery with possibly an appeal to novelty logical fallacy being part of the bias.
Modèle:Vanchor That the "gist" of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim wording.[158] This is because memories are representations, not exact copies.
von Restorff effect That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items.[159]
Zeigarnik effect That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones.

Notes et références modifier

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  2. ↑ (en-US) « Cognitive Bias – Association for Psychological Science », www.psychologicalscience.org (consulté le )
  3. ↑ (en) Thomas, « Two decades of cognitive bias research in entrepreneurship: What do we know and where do we go from here? », Management Review Quarterly, vol. 68, no 2,‎ , p. 107–143 (ISSN 2198-1620, DOI 10.1007/s11301-018-0135-9)
  4. ↑ (en) « MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood », Psychological Review, vol. 106, no 1,‎ , p. 180–209 (DOI 10.1037/0033-295x.106.1.180, lire en ligne)
  5. ↑ (en) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell, (ISBN 978-1-4051-1304-5), « Bounded and Rational », p. 129
  6. ↑ a b c d e et f (en)Martin Hilbert (2012) "Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making". Psychological Bulletin, 138(2), 211–237; accès ouvert : https://www.martinhilbert.net/toward-a-synthesis-of-cognitive-biases/
  7. ↑ (en) « Biases in the interpretation and use of research results », Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 49, no 1,‎ , p. 259–87 (PMID 15012470, DOI 10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.259, lire en ligne)
  8. ↑ (en) Nickerson, « Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises », Review of General Psychology, vol. 2, no 2,‎ , p. 175–220 [198] (DOI 10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175, lire en ligne)
  9. ↑ (en) « Confirmation Bias as a Social Skill », Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 21, no 11,‎ , p. 1229–1239 (DOI 10.1177/01461672952111011, lire en ligne)
  10. ↑ (en) « Hyperbolically discounted temporal difference learning », Neural Computation, vol. 22, no 6,‎ , p. 1511–27 (PMID 20100071, PMCID 3005720, DOI 10.1162/neco.2010.08-09-1080)
  11. ↑ (en)(en) « Why do we prefer doing something to doing nothing », The Decision Lab,‎ (lire en ligne)
  12. ↑ (en) Anthony Patt et Richard Zeckhauser, « Action Bias and Environmental Decisions », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 21,‎ , p. 45-72 (DOI 10.1023/A:1026517309871, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  13. ↑ (en)(en) « People add by default even when subtraction makes more sense », Science News,‎ (lire en ligne)
  14. ↑ (en) Gabrielle S. Adams, Benjamin A. Converse, Andrew H. Hales et Leidy E. Klotz, « People systematically overlook subtractive changes », Nature, vol. 592, no 7853,‎ , p. 258–261 (ISSN 1476-4687, PMID 33828317, DOI 10.1038/s41586-021-03380-y, Bibcode 2021Natur.592..258A, S2CID 233185662, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  15. ↑ Baron 1994, p. 372
  16. ↑ (en)« A Preliminary Research on Modeling Cognitive Agents for Social Environments in Multi-Agent Systems », {{Article}} : paramètre « périodique » manquant,‎ , p. 116–123 (lire en ligne)
  17. ↑ a b et c (en)(en) Neuropsychology in the Courtroom: Expert Analysis of Reports and Testimony, New York, Guilford Press, (ISBN 9781593856342), « Misdiagnosis of Cognitive Impairment in Forensic Neuropsychology », p. 248
  18. ↑ (en)« Common origins of diverse misconceptions: cognitive principles and the development of biology thinking », CBE Life Sciences Education, vol. 11, no 3,‎ , p. 209–15 (PMID 22949417, PMCID 3433289, DOI 10.1187/cbe.12-06-0074)
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  20. ↑ (en)« Dehumanized Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture, and Genocide? », Zeitschrift für Psychologie, vol. 219, no 3,‎ , p. 175–181 (PMID 24511459, PMCID 3915417, DOI 10.1027/2151-2604/a000065)
  21. ↑ (en)« Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study », Psychological Bulletin, vol. 133, no 1,‎ , p. 1–24 (PMID 17201568, DOI 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1, S2CID 2861872, lire en ligne)
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  24. ↑ (en)Lawrence J. Sanna, Norbert Schwarz et Shevaun L. Stocker, « When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight. », Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 28, no 3,‎ , p. 497–502 (ISSN 0278-7393, PMID 12018501, DOI 10.1037/0278-7393.28.3.497, CiteSeerx 10.1.1.387.5964, lire en ligne)
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  34. ↑ (en)« Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences », Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 20, no 6,‎ , p. 1420–1436 (DOI 10.1037/0278-7393.20.6.1420)
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  40. ↑ Why We Spend Coins Faster Than Bills by Chana Joffe-Walt. All Things Considered, 12 May 2009.
  41. ↑ (en)« Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation », Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 86, no 5,‎ , p. 680–95 (PMID 15161394, DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680, CiteSeerx 10.1.1.484.9171)
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  44. ↑ Duration Neglect in Retrospective Evaluations of Affective Episodes « https://web.archive.org/web/20170808092231/http://pages.ucsd.edu/~nchristenfeld/Happiness_Readings_files/Class%209%20-%20Fredrickson%201993.pdf »(Archive.org • Wikiwix • Archive.is • Google • Que faire ?), | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
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    « Young people, middle-aged people, and older people all believed they had changed a lot in the past but would change relatively little in the future. »
  47. ↑ (Kahneman, Knetsch et Thaler 1991, p. 193) Richard Thaler coined the term "endowment effect."
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  116. ↑ Baron 1994, p. 275
  117. ↑ Kathryn B. Anderson et Loranel M. Graham, « Hostile Attribution Bias », dans Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, SAGE Publications, Inc., , 446–447 p. (ISBN 9781412916707, DOI 10.4135/9781412956253)
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  125. ↑ « {{{1}}} »
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  130. ↑ « Psychological probability as a function of experienced frequency », Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 46, no 2,‎ , p. 81–6 (PMID 13084849, DOI 10.1037/h0057955)
  131. ↑ « Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence », Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 3, no 4,‎ , p. 552–564 (DOI 10.1037/0096-1523.3.4.552, S2CID 54888532, lire en ligne)
  132. ↑ (en) John Cacioppo, Foundations in social neuroscience, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, , 130–132 p. (ISBN 978-0262531955)
  133. ↑ a et b « The seven sins of memory. Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience », The American Psychologist, vol. 54, no 3,‎ , p. 182–203 (PMID 10199218, DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182, S2CID 14882268, lire en ligne)
  134. ↑ « Effects of humor on sentence memory », Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 20, no 4,‎ , p. 953–67 (PMID 8064254, DOI 10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.953, lire en ligne [archive du ], consulté le )
  135. ↑ Stephen R. Schmidt, « Life Is Pleasant—and Memory Helps to Keep It That Way! », Review of General Psychology, vol. 7, no 2,‎ , p. 203–210 (DOI 10.1037/1089-2680.7.2.203, S2CID 43179740, lire en ligne)
  136. ↑ « Toward a psychology of memory accuracy », Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 51, no 1,‎ , p. 481–537 (PMID 10751979, DOI 10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.481)
  137. ↑ Craik & Lockhart, 1972
  138. ↑ « The list length effect in recognition memory: an analysis of potential confounds », Memory & Cognition, vol. 39, no 2,‎ , p. 348–63 (PMID 21264573, DOI 10.3758/s13421-010-0007-6)
  139. ↑ (en) Wayne Weiten, Psychology: Themes and Variations, Cengage Learning, (ISBN 978-0-495-60197-5, lire en ligne), p. 338
  140. ↑ « Perspective: the negativity bias, medical education, and the culture of academic medicine: why culture change is hard », Academic Medicine, vol. 87, no 9,‎ , p. 1205–9 (PMID 22836850, DOI 10.1097/ACM.0b013e3182628f03)
  141. ↑ (en) Wayne Weiten, Psychology: Themes and Variations, Cengage Learning, (ISBN 978-0-495-09303-9, lire en ligne), p. 260
  142. ↑ « An examination of trace storage in free recall », Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 76, no 4,‎ , p. 504–13 (PMID 5650563, DOI 10.1037/h0025695)
  143. ↑ « Recognition memory for words, sentences, and pictures », Journal of Learning and Verbal Behavior, vol. 6,‎ , p. 156–163 (DOI 10.1016/s0022-5371(67)80067-7)
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  147. ↑ « The picture superiority effect in patients with Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment », Neuropsychologia, vol. 47, no 2,‎ , p. 595–8 (PMID 18992266, PMCID 2763351, DOI 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.010)
  148. ↑ « Picture superiority doubly dissociates the ERP correlates of recollection and familiarity », Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 23, no 5,‎ , p. 1247–62 (PMID 20350169, DOI 10.1162/jocn.2010.21464, S2CID 6568038)
  149. ↑ (en) G. Neil Martin, Neil R. Carlson et William Buskist, Psychology, 3rd, , 309–310 p. (ISBN 978-0-273-71086-8)
  150. ↑ Edward J. O'Brien et Jerome L. Myers, « When comprehension difficulty improves memory for text », Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 11, no 1,‎ , p. 12–21 (DOI 10.1037/0278-7393.11.1.12, lire en ligne)
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  152. ↑ (en) David A. Lieberman, Human Learning and Memory, Cambridge University Press, (ISBN 978-1-139-50253-5, lire en ligne), p. 432
  153. ↑ Morton, Crowder & Prussin, 1971
  154. ↑ (en) Ian Pitt et Alistair D. N. Edwards, Design of Speech-Based Devices: A Practical Guide, Springer, (ISBN 978-1-85233-436-9, lire en ligne), p. 26
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  158. ↑ Poppenk, Walia, Joanisse, Danckert, & Köhler, 2006
  159. ↑ H Von Restorff, « Über die Wirkung von Bereichsbildungen im Spurenfeld (The effects of field formation in the trace field)". », Psychological Research, vol. 18, no 1,‎ , p. 299–342 (DOI 10.1007/bf02409636, S2CID 145479042)

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[[Catégorie:Liste en rapport avec la psychologie]] [[Catégorie:Biais cognitif]]

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